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Abstract. Data describing historical growth of human population, global and regional 
(Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia, former USSR, Africa and Latin America), are 
analysed. Results are in harmony with the earlier analysis of the historical growth of the 
world population in the past 12,000 years and with other independent studies. This analysis 
is also in harmony with the study of the historical economic growth. Within the range of 
analysable data, there was no Malthusian stagnation. Takeoffs from stagnation to growth, 
postulated by the Unified Growth Theory never happened. There were no escapes from the 
Malthusian trap because there was no trap in the growth of population. This analysis and 
the earlier studies of the Gross Domestic Product lead to the conclusion that there were also 
no takeoffs in the income per capita distributions, claimed by the Unified Growth Theory. 
Consequently, the claimed differential timing in takeoffs never happened. Unified Growth 
Theory is contradicted yet again by the mathematical analysis of the same data, which were 
used, but never analysed, during the formulation of this theory. The study presented here, as 
well as earlier publications on the related topics, shows also that certain fundamental 
postulates used in the economic and demographic research are repeatedly contradicted by 
the mathematical analysis of data. 
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1. Introduction 
istorical economic growth can be studied using the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). However, to understand the time dependence of the 
income per capita (GDP/cap) it is necessary to understand not only the 
economic growth, expressed in terms of the GDP, but also the growth of human 
population. We have already analysed the GDP data (Nielsen, 2016a; 2016b; 
2016d).  Now, we shall analyse the growth of human population using the same 
source of data (Maddison, 2010). The aim of these studiesis to investigate the 
validity of the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a; 2011) and to understand the 
mechanism of growth as revealed by data because the correct interpretation of the 
historical growth can help in the correct interpretation of the current economic 
growth and of the growth of population. 
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Our earlier analysis (Nielsen, 2016a; 2016b; 2016d) demonstrated that the 
historical economic growth, regional and global, was hyperbolic. Thus, if 
unchecked, the natural tendency for the economic growth is to follow hyperbolic 
distributions. This type of spontaneous growth is undesirable because hyperbolic 
distributions escape to infinity at a fixed time. To avoid such a rapidand potentially 
catastrophicincrease economicgrowth has to be closely monitored and controlled.   
Analysis published over 50 years ago (von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960) 
demonstrated that the growth of the world population was also hyperbolic during 
the AD era. The follow-up analysis (Nielsen, 2016c) demonstrated that the growth 
of the world population was hyperbolic not only during the AD era but also during 
the BC era, for the total of around 12,000 years. This particular analysis identified 
two demographic transitions in the past growth of the population: between 500 BC 
and AD 500 and between AD 1200 and 1400. However, these transitions were of a 
different kind than the transitions assumed routinely in demographic research. 
They were not transitions from stagnation to growth but from growth to growth, or 
more precisely, from hyperbolic growth to hyperbolic growth. The first transition 
was from a fast hyperbolic growth during the BC era to a significantly slower 
hyperbolic growth during the AD era. During this transition, the size of human 
population reached a maximum around AD 1 and after reaching a minimum 
between AD 400 and 500 it resumed it slower hyperbolic growth during the AD 
era. However, the starting size of global population in AD 500 was significantly 
larger than in 10,000 BC and the slower hyperbolic growth increased rapidly to 
reach a large size of the population in only about 2000 years. During this first 
demographic transition, the growth rate decreased from 0.252% in 500 BC to 
0.066% in AD 500. The second transition was hardly noticeable but it resulted in a 
change from a slow hyperbolic trajectory to a slightly faster hyperbolic trajectory. 
During this transition, after a short delay in the growth of the population, the 
growth rate increased only marginally from 0.123% in AD 1200 to 0.157% in AD 
1400. Currently the growth of the world population experiences a third 
demographic transition to a yet unknown trajectory. 
 
2. Unified Growth Theory 
The latest and the most elaborate theory describing economic growth is the 
Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a; 2011). It is not a theory, which is widely 
accepted by economist and used in their research. In fact, the opposite seems to be 
true. However, we are using this theory as an example for two reasons. First, it is a 
theory, which is firmly based on traditional but erroneous assumptions about the 
historical economic growth and about the historical growth of human population. 
Our primary aim here, the same aim we hadin earlier publications (Nielsen, 2014; 
2015a; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2016d; 2016e), is not just to test the validity of this 
theory or the validity of a similar Demographic Transition Theory (see Nielsen, 
2016e and references therein) but to test the validity of the fundamental postulates 
used in the economic and demographic research. Second, Unified Growth Theory 
appears to be the only theory where Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001) were used 
systematically but unfortunately they were never analysed. They were manipulated 
and distorted to support preconceived ideas. Now, precisely the same data can be 
used to show that the preconceived ideas used and promoted in this theory are 
incorrect (Nielsen, 2014; 2015a; 2016a; 2016b; 2016d). Here we have a difference 
between a study based on the manipulation of data and a study based on the 
rigorous analysis of data.  
In the last years of his life, Magnusson, the world-renown economist, published 
excellent data describing not only the economic growth as expressed by the Gross 
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Domestic Product (GDP) but also the growth of human population, global, regional 
and national (Magnuson, 2001; 2010). These data are a treasure trove, which can 
be used in the economic and demographic research. In particular, they can be used 
to test the fundamental postulates supporting these two fields of research. Galor 
used the earlier compilation of these data (Magnuson, 2001) but any of them can be 
used to test the fundamental postulates supporting economic and demographic 
research, and in particular to test the validity of the Unified Growth Theory.  
Unfortunately, this theory and its fundamental postulates are based on the 
habitually distorted and self-misleading presentations of data (Ashraf, 2009; Galor, 
2005a; 2005b; 2007; 2008a; 2008b; 2008c; 2010; 2011; 2012a; 2012b; 2012c; 
Galor & Moav, 2002; Snowdon & Galor, 2008). This counterproductive approach 
to research was used to promote such scientifically-unsupported concepts as the 
concept of the three regimes of growth (Malthusian regime of stagnation, post-
Malthusian regime and sustained-growth regime), the concept of sudden takeoffs 
from stagnation to growth, the concept of differential timing of takeoffs and the 
concept of the great divergence. An example of the strongly deceptive and 
misleading diagrams used in the Unified Growth Theory and in other related 
publications is shown in Figure 1. (All diagrams are presented in the Appendix.)  
Hyperbolic distributions do not have to be distorted to be confusing. They are 
already sufficiently confusing and it is easy to make mistakes with their 
interpretations. Hyperbolic distributions have to be carefully and methodically 
analysed and fortunately their analysis becomes trivial when using the reciprocal 
values of data (Nielsen, 2014). Displays, such as presented in Figure 1, which is 
based on a figure presented by Galor (2005a, p. 181), are self-misleading and they 
inevitably lead to incorrect conclusions.  
The correct and accurate display of Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001), 
precisely the same data as used but never scientifically analysed during the 
formulation of the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011), is presented in 
Figure 2. Analysis of these data reveals that they follow monotonically-increasing 
distributions, which are impossible to divide into distinctly-different regimes of 
growth governed by distinctly-different mechanisms (Nielsen, 2014; 2015a). There 
was no stagnation and no transition from stagnation to growth. There was no 
escape from the Malthusian Trap because there was no trap in the economic 
growth. 
Whether expressed by using the GDP or GDP/cap, economic growth was slow 
over a long time and fast over a short time but it was monotonically increasing all 
the time. What appears as stagnation was a part of the monotonically-increasing 
distribution, and what appears as a sudden takeoff was the natural continuation of 
the same monotonically-increasing distribution.  
Attempts to determine the time of the perceived transition from slow to fast 
growth are bound to be unsuccessful because there was no transition (Nielsen, 
2014; 2015a). The growth of the GDP is described by hyperbolic distributions 
(Nielsen, 2014; 2016a) and the growth of the GDP/cap by the linearly-modulated 
hyperbolic distributions (Nielsen; 2015a).  
One of the fundamental postulates of the Unified Growth Theory is the 
postulate of the existence of three regimes of growth governed by three distinctly 
different mechanisms: (1) the Malthusian regime of stagnation, (2) the post-
Malthusian regime, and (3) the sustained-growth regime. This postulate applies not 
only to the growth of the GDP but also to the growth of human population because 
Galor discusses the growth of income per capita, (GDP/cap), which is made of two 
components: the growth of the GDP and the growth of population. 
According to Galor (2005a; 2008a; 2011; 2012a), Malthusian regime of 
stagnation was between 100,000 BC and AD 1750 for developed regions and 
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between 100,000 BC and AD 1900 for less-developed regions. The claimed 
starting time appears to be based entirely on conjecture because Maddison’s data 
are terminated at AD 1 and even they contain significant gaps below AD 1500. The 
post-Malthusian regime was allegedly between AD 1750 and 1850 for developed 
regions and from 1900 for less-developed regions. The sustained-growth regime 
was supposed to have commenced around 1850 for developed regions. 
Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a; 2008a; 2011; 2012a) can be tested in 
many ways but the easiest way to test it is to look for the dramatic takeoffs from 
stagnation to growth. These takeoffs are described as a ―remarkable‖ or ―stunning‖ 
escape from the Malthusian trap (Galor, 2005a: pp. 177, 220). It is a signature, 
which cannot be missed.  
This change in the pattern of growth is described as ―the sudden take-off from 
stagnation to growth‖ (Galor, 2005a: pp. 177, 220, 277) or as a ―sudden spurt‖ 
(Galor, 2005a: 177, 220). According to Galor, for developed regions, the end of the 
Malthusian regime of stagnation coincides with the Industrial Revolution. ―The 
take-off of developed regions from the Malthusian Regime was associated with the 
Industrial Revolution‖ (Galor, 2005a: p. 185). Indeed, the Industrial Revolution is 
considered to have been ―the prime engine of economic growth‖ (Galor, 2005a: p. 
212).  
The signature of takeoffs is characterised by three features: (1) it should be a 
prominent change in the pattern of growth, (2) it should be a transition from 
stagnation to growth and (3) it should occur at the time predicted by the theory. For 
developed regions, the postulated takeoffs should occur around AD 1750, or 
around the time of the Industrial Revolution, 1760-1840 (Floud & McCloskey, 
1994). For less-developed regions, they should occur around 1900. The added 
advantage of using this simple test is that there are no significant gaps in the data 
around the time of the postulated takeoffs and consequently the stagnation and the 
expected prominent transitions from stagnation to growth should be easily 
identifiable.  
A transition from growth to growth is not a signature of the postulated takeoff 
from stagnation to growth. Thus, for instance, a transition from hyperbolic growth 
to another hyperbolic growth or to some other steadily-increasing trajectory is not a 
signature of the sudden takeoff from stagnation to growth. Likewise, a transition at 
a distinctly different time is not a confirmation of the theoretical expectations.  
The takeoffs claimed by Galor are in the income per capita (GDP/cap), which 
means that there should be takeoffs from stagnation to growth in at least one of 
these components (in the GDP or in the population or in both of them) at a specific 
time (Galor, 2008a; 2012a). We have already demonstrated that the Unified 
Growth Theory is contradicted by the GDP data describing the world economic 
growth as well as the economic growth in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, 
countries of the former USSR, Asia, Africa and Latin America (Nielsen, 2016a; 
2016b; 2016d). We have also demonstrated that the Unified Growth Theory is 
contradicted by the data describing the growth of the world income per capita 
(Nielsen, 2015a). Our next step now is to extend our analysis to the growth of 
population and thus to extend our study of income per capita, not only global but 
also regional. 
We have already demonstrated that there were no takeoffs in the growth of the 
GDP. Consequently, to confirm the Unified Growth Theory we would have to 
show not only that there were takeoffs from stagnation to growth in the growth of 
the population but also that these takeoffs occurred at the specific time claimed by 
Galor (2008a; 2012a), around AD 1750 for developed regions (Western Europe, 
Eastern Europe and the former USSR) and at around AD 1900 for less developed 
regions (Asia, Africa and Latin America). We shall now demonstrate that there 
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were no such takeoffs. Thus we shall demonstrate implicitly that there were no 
takeoffs in the income per capita, which means that Galor’s postulate of the 
differential timing in takeoffs is also contradicted by data, because we cannot have 
differential timing in takeoffs without takeoffs. 
 
3. Essentials of the mathematical analysis 
Hyperbolic distribution describing growth is represented by a reciprocal of a 
linear function:  
 
1
( )S t
a kt


,        (1) 
 
where ( )S t  is the size of the growing entity, in our case the population, while a 
and k are positive constants.  
As pointed out earlier (Nielsen, 2014), hyperbolic distributions are confusing 
because they create an illusion of being made of two components, slow and fast, 
with perhaps even a third component in the middle. It is easy to make a mistake 
with their interpretations. Fortunately, these distributions are easy to analyse by 
using the reciprocal values of data, 1/ ( )S t : 
 
1
( )
a kt
S t
  .        (2) 
 
In this representation, data follow a decreasing straight line, which obviously 
cannot be divided into two or three distinctly different components. 
Reciprocal values help in an easy and generally unique identification of 
hyperbolic growth. Apart from serving as an alternative way to analyse data, 
reciprocal values allow also for the investigation of even small deviations from 
hyperbolic distributions because deviations from a straight line can be easily 
noticed.  
The illusion of different components also disappears when using semi 
logarithmic scales of reference. Both types of displays help in an easy 
identification of disagreements between data and fitted curves for small values of 
data and we shall use both of these displays.  
 
4. Growth of the world population 
Results of mathematical analysis of the world population are presented in 
Figures 3 and 4. Reciprocal values of historical data identify uniquely hyperbolic 
distribution between AD 1000 and around 1950 because they follow a decreasing 
straight line. From around 1950, the growth of the world population started to be 
diverted to a slower trajectory but first it was slightly boosted. The boosting was 
small (it is hardly noticeable in the displayed diagrams) and it did not last long.  
Hyperbolic fit to the world population data (Maddison, 2010) is shown in 
Figure 4. The fit is remarkably good. The point at AD 1 is 75% higher than the 
fitted curve. This discrepancy is in perfect agreement with the analysis of the 
growth of the world population over the past 12,000 years (Nielsen, 2016c), which 
demonstrated a maximum around that year.  
Parameters describing hyperbolic trajectory fitting the data between AD 1000 
and 1950 are:  07.73 19 0a   and 33.765 10k   . Its singularity is at 2056t   
. However, from around 1950, the growth of the world population started to be 
diverted to a slower trajectory bypassing the singularity by a safe margin of 106 
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years. This diversion was first manifested in a minor and short-lasting boosting of 
the growth of the world population. 
The data are in disagreement with the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a; 
2011), which erroneously claims stagnation and takeoffs from stagnation to 
growth. There was no stagnation but monotonically-increasing hyperbolic 
distribution. There were also no takeoffs from stagnation to growth around AD 
1750 for developed regions and around AD 1900 for less-developed regions 
because there was no stagnation and because hyperbolic growth continued 
undisturbed. If there were such takeoffs in the respective regions they must have 
been too weak to change the growth of global population because the growth 
trajectory was remarkably stable during these alleged takeoffs. Furthermore, our 
analysis shows that the Industrial Revolution had no impact on the growth 
trajectory. Unified Growth Theory is yet again demonstrably contradicted by data.  
With the absence of takeoffs in the growth of the population and with the earlier 
demonstrated absence of takeoffs in the growth of the GDP (Nielsen, 2016a), this 
analysis shows that there were no takeoffs in the income per capita (GDP/cap) 
distribution confirming our previous analysis based on the earlier compilation of 
Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001). Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a; 2011) 
is contradicted by data, which were used but never analysed during the formulation 
of this theory. 
 
5. Western Europe 
Growth of population in Western Europe is shown in Figures 5 and 6. Western 
Europe is represented by the total of 30 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, Greece, Portugal, Spain and by 14 small, but unspecified 
countries. Ireland is missing in this list because it was included only from 1921.  
The straight line fitting the reciprocal values of data, shown in Figure 5, 
identifies uniquely hyperbolic distribution between AD 1000 and around 1915. 
Parameters describing hyperbolic growth in Western Europe are:  17.54 12 0a  
and 23.749 10k   . The point of singularity is at 2012t   . From around 1915, 
the growth of population in Western Europe started to be diverted to a slower, but 
still fast-increasing, trajectory bypassing the singularity by a safe margin of 97 
years. The size of the population in AD 1 is 89% larger than for the fitted 
hyperbolic distribution. This discrepancy is probably reflecting the maximum in 
the growth of the world population around that year (Nielsen, 2016c). 
Figures 5 and 6 show that hyperbolic growth between AD 1000 and 1915 
remained undisturbed. Industrial Revolution had absolutely no impact on changing 
the hyperbolic growth trajectory in the region where the effects of this revolution 
should be most prominent. There was no takeoff from stagnation to growth at the 
postulated time (Galor, 2008a; 2012a) because there was no stagnation in the 
growth of population. There was even no transition to a faster hyperbolic 
trajectory.  
With the absence of the takeoff in the growth of the population in Western 
Europe and with the earlier demonstrated absence of the takeoff in the growth of 
the GDP (Nielsen, 2016a), this analysis shows that there was no takeoff in the 
income per capita (GDP/cap) distribution. Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 
2011) is contradicted by data, which were used but never analysed during the 
formulation of this theory. 
 
 
 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 3(2), R.W. Nielsen, p.242-263. 
248 
248 
6. Eastern Europe 
Results of analysis of the growth of population in Eastern Europe are 
summarized in Figures 7 and 8. Reciprocal values of data shown in Figure 7 
identify uniquely hyperbolic distribution between AD 1000 and around 1935. From 
that year, the growth of population started to be diverted to a slower trajectory.  
Hyperbolic parameters are: 23.05 15 0a   and 11.525 10k   . The point of 
singularity is at 2003t  . Figures 7 and 8 demonstrate that the Industrial 
Revolution had no impact on the trajectory of the growth of population in Eastern 
Europe and that there was no takeoff from stagnation to growth at the postulated 
time (Galor, 2008a; 2012a) because there was no stagnation but hyperbolic growth. 
There was even no takeoff to a faster hyperbolic growth. The size of the population 
inAD 1 was 45% higher than the calculated curve reflecting probably the 
maximum in the growth of the world population around that year (Nielsen, 2016c). 
With the absence of the takeoff in the growth of population in Eastern Europe 
and with the earlier demonstrated absence of the takeoff in the growth of the GDP 
(Nielsen, 2016a), this analysis shows that there was no takeoff in the income per 
capita (GDP/cap) distribution. Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a; 2011) is 
contradicted by data, which were used but never analysed during the formulation of 
this theory. 
 
7. Former USSR 
The analysis of data for countries of the former USSR is presented in Figures 9 
and 10. Reciprocal values shown in Figure 9 identify uniquely hyperbolic 
distribution between AD 1 and around 1920. Hyperbolic fit to the data is between 
AD 1 and 1870. Parameters fitting the data are: 22.61 18 0a   and
11.333 10k   . The singularity is at 1965t  . From around 1920, the growth of 
population in the former USSR started to be diverted to a slower trajectory, 
bypassing the singularity by around 45 years.  
Figures 9 and 10 show that the Industrial Revolution had no impact on shaping 
the growth of human population in countries of the former USSR. There was also 
no takeoff from stagnation to growth around the postulated time Galor (2008a; 
2012a) or around any other time because the growth was not stagnant but 
hyperbolic. There was even no transition to a faster hyperbolic trajectory but there 
was a transition to a slower, non-hyperbolic growth around 1920.  
With the absence of the takeoff in the growth of the population in countries of 
the former USSR and with the earlier demonstrated absence of the takeoff in the 
growth of the GDP (Nielsen, 2016a), this analysis shows that there was no takeoff 
in the income per capita (GDP/cap) distribution. Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 
2005a; 2011) is contradicted by data, which were used but never analysed during 
the formulation of this theory. 
 
8. Asia 
Analysis of the growth of human population in Asia (including Japan) is 
summarised in Figures 11 and 12. Reciprocal values presented in Figure 11 
identify uniquely hyperbolic distribution between AD 1000 and around 1920. 
Parameters describing this distribution are:  11.06 18 0a   and 34.999 10k   . 
The point of singularity is at 2135t  .  
Asia is made primarily of less-developed countries (BBC, 2014; Pereira, 2011) 
and consequently, according to Galor (2008a; 2012a), the growth of human 
population in Asia should have been characterised by stagnation until around 1900, 
the year marking the alleged stunning escape from the Malthusian trap, the 
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supposed escape manifested by the postulated dramatic takeoff. (The population of 
Japan before AD 1900 was on average less than 4% of the total population of 
Asia.) The data and their analysis show that there was no stagnation, at least from 
AD 1000 and there was also no expected takeoff.   
The data reveal a steadily increasing hyperbolic growth until around 1920. From 
around that year the growth of population was diverted to a faster trajectory. This 
boosting can be seen clearly in Figures 11 and 12 and it occurred close to the time 
of the postulated takeoff from stagnation to growth. However, it was not a 
transition from stagnation to growth but from hyperbolic growth to a slightly faster 
trajectory of a different kind. It is, therefore, not the takeoff postulated by Galor. 
Furthermore, it was only a temporary boosting, which is now returning to the 
original hyperbolic trajectory and, as indicated by the reciprocal values of data,this 
new trend is likely to be slower than the original trajectory.  
With the absence of the postulated takeoff in the growth of population in Asia 
and with the earlier demonstrated absence of the takeoff in the growth of the GDP 
(Nielsen, 2016a), this analysis shows that there was no takeoff in the income per 
capita (GDP/cap) distribution. Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a; 2011) is 
contradicted by data, which were used but never analysed during the formulation of 
this theory. 
 
9. Africa 
Results of analysis of the growth of human population in 57 African countries 
are presented in Figures 13 and 14. Reciprocal values identify uniquely two 
hyperbolic trajectories: AD 1-1840 and AD 1840-1980. At first it was a slow 
hyperbolic growth characterised by parameters 15.79 14 0a   and
22.473 10k   and by the singularity at 2343t  .  Then, around 1840, this slow 
hyperbolic growth was replaced by a significantly faster hyperbolic growth 
characterised by parameters 21.57 11 0a   and 27.834 10k   and by singularity 
at 2006t  . Defined by the parameter k, this new growth was 3.2 times faster than 
the earlier hyperbolic growth. From around 1980, this fast hyperbolic growth was 
diverted to a slower, non-hyperbolic trajectory, bypassing singularity by 26 years. 
Africa is also made of less-developed countries (BBC, 2014; Pereira, 2011) so 
according to Galor (2008a; 2012a) it should have experienced stagnation until 
around 1900 followed by a clear takeoff around that year. These expectations are 
contradicted by data because (1) the growth of population was not stagnant but 
hyperbolic until around 1980 and (2) because there was no takeoff from stagnation 
to growth around 1900 or around any other time. In fact, around that time 
hyperbolic growth continued unaffected in contradiction of the wished-for 
interpretations.    
The acceleration in the growth of human population in Africa occurred around 
1840, but it was not a transition from stagnation to growth but from growth to 
growth. Even more precisely, it was a transition from hyperbolic growth to another 
hyperbolic growth. 
Africa is the only region where the commencement of the rapid growth of 
population coincides with the Industrial Revolution but it also the region, which 
demonstrates that the usually-claimed effects of Industrial Revolution are 
contradicted by empirical evidence. According to the generally accepted 
interpretation, Industrial Revolution improved medical care and introduced many 
other beneficial effects, which were supposed to have caused population explosion. 
Data for Africa demonstrate that this wished-for mechanism does not work because 
the growth of population on this continent coincides with the rapidly-deteriorating 
living conditions of native populations brought about by the intensified 
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colonisation (Duignan & Gunn, 1973; McKay, Hill, Buckler, Ebrey, Beck, 
Crowston, & Wiesner-Hanks, 2012; Pakenham, 1992).  
This fast growth of population in Africa, which commenced around the time 
when living conditions started to deteriorate rapidly, is easy to explain by noticing 
that the growth rate of population is directly proportional to the level of 
deprivation (Nielsen, 2013), the process, which is diametrically opposite to the 
usually claimed influence of the Industrial Revolution. It appears, therefore, that it 
is not the improved living conditions but the increased level of deprivation that 
have a stimulating effect on the growth of population. 
With the absence of the takeoff around AD 1900 in Africa and with the earlier 
demonstrated absence of the takeoff in the growth of the GDP (Nielsen, 2016a), 
this analysis shows that there was no takeoff in the income per capita (GDP/cap) 
distribution. Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a; 2011) is contradicted by data, 
which were used but never analysed during the formulation of this theory. 
 
10. Latin America 
Results of analysis of population growth in Latin America are presented in 
Figures 15 and 16. Data for Latin America are difficult to analyse because there 
was a significant decline in the growth of population between AD 1500 and 1600 
but they also appear to follow two distinctly different hyperbolic trajectories, which 
can be easily identified using the reciprocal values of data (see Figure 15). 
However, the identification of the first trajectory is not as clear as for Africa. The 
identification of the second hyperbolic trajectory is more convincing. Tentative 
conclusion is that the growth of population in Latin America was following a slow 
hyperbolic distribution between AD 1 and 1500 and a fast hyperbolic distribution 
between AD 1600 and around 1900.  
The tentatively assigned slow hyperbolic growth between AD 1 and 1500 is 
characterised by parameters 21.765 10a   and 28.242 10k   . Its singularity is 
at 2142t  .  The better determined fast hyperbolic growth between AD 1600 and 
1900 is characterised by parameters 26.56 11 0a   and 13.371 10k   . Its 
singularity is at 1947t  . Defined by the parameter k, this growth was 4.1 times 
faster than the earlier hyperbolic growth. From around 1900, this fast hyperbolic 
growth started to be diverted to a slower trajectory bypassing the singularity by 47 
years. The transition from the earlier apparent hyperbolic growth to a new and 
rapid hyperbolic growth, which occurred between around AD 1500 and 1600 
appears to coincide with the commencement of the Spanish conquest (Bethell, 
1984) and with the rapidly-deteriorating living conditions. The mechanism of this 
fast growth of population in Latin America appears to be the same as the 
mechanism of the fast growth in Africa, which commenced around AD 1840. 
Latin America is also made of less-developed countries (BBC, 2014; Pereira, 
2011) so again, according to Galor (2008a; 2012a), the growth of human 
population in this regions should have been stagnant until around 1900 and fast-
increasing from around that year. This pattern of growth is contradicted by data. 
The data show a diametrically different pattern: (1) there is no convincing evidence 
of the existence of stagnation over the entire range of time between AD 1 and 1900 
(there are no signs of Malthusian oscillations) but there is a sufficiently convincing 
evidence of hyperbolic growth particularly between AD 1600 and 1900; (2) there 
was no takeoff from stagnation to growth at any time; and (3) at the time of the 
postulated takeoff in 1900 the growth of population started to be diverted to a 
slower trajectory. The wished-for takeoff is replaced by a slower growth. However, 
even if we had a takeoff around that time it would have been a takeoff of a 
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different kind, not a takeoff from stagnation to growth as required by the Unified 
Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a; 2011) but a takeoff from growth to growth.  
With the absence of the takeoff in the growth of population in Latin America 
and with the earlier demonstrated absence of the takeoff in the growth of the GDP 
(Nielsen, 2016a), this analysis shows that there was no takeoff in the income per 
capita (GDP/cap) distribution. Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a; 2011) is 
contradicted by data, which were used but never analysed during the formulation of 
this theory. 
 
11. Summary and conclusions 
Results of mathematical analysis of the historical growth of human population 
are summarised in Table 1. The listed parameters,a andk,are for the fitted 
hyperbolic distributions. 
This analysis demonstrates that the natural tendency for the historical growth of 
human population was to increase hyperbolically. In general, there is a remarkably 
good agreement between the data and the calculated hyperbolic distributions. 
Unlike the more familiar exponential distributions, which are easier to 
understand because they show more readily a gradually increasing growth, 
hyperbolic distributions appear to be made of two or maybe even three 
components: a slow component, a fast component and perhaps even a transition 
component located between the apparent slow and fast components. The illusion is 
so strong that even the most experienced researchers can be deceived particularly if 
they have no access to good sets of data, which was in the past. Now, however, 
excellent data are available (Maddison, 2001; 2010) and we can use them to check 
the earlier interpretations of economic growth and of the growth of human 
population.   
 
Table 1.Summary of the mathematical analysis or the historical growth of population 
Region/Countries a k Hyperbolic 
Range 
Singul
arity 
Proxi
mity 
Take
off 
World 07.739 10  33.765 10  1000 – 1950 2056 106 X 
Western Europe 17.542 10  23.749 10  1000 – 1915 2012 97 X 
Eastern Europe 23.055 10  11.525 10  1000 – 1935 2003 68 X 
Former USSR 22.618 10  11.333 10  1 – 1920 1965 45 X 
Asia 11.068 10  34.999 10  1000 – 1920 2135 215 X 
Africa 
 
15.794 10  
21.571 10  
22.473 10  
27.834 10  
1 – 1840 
1840 – 1980  
2343 
2006 
 
26 
 
X          
Latin America 
 
21.765 10  
26.561 10  
28.242 10  
13.371 10  
1 – 1500 
1600 – 1900  
2142 
1947 
 
47 
 
X 
Notes: a and k – Hyperbolic growth parameters [see eqn (1)]. Hyperbolic Range - The empirically-
confirmed range of time when the growth of population can be described using hyperbolic 
distributions. Singularity - The time of the escape to infinity for a given hyperbolic distribution. 
Proximity - Proximity (in years) of the singularity at the time when the growth of population departed 
from the hyperbolic growth to a new trajectory. X - No takeoff from stagnation to growth. Takeoffs 
claimed by the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2008a, 2011, 2012a) did not happen because 
there was no stagnation in the growth of population. The growth was monotonically hyperbolic.  
 
The postulate of the existence of the epoch of Malthusian stagnation is 
suggested by a slow growth over a long time but this slow growth is just a part of 
the hyperbolic growth, which can be convincingly identified using reciprocal 
values. Hyperbolic distributions create also the illusion of a sudden takeoff but this 
feature is also a part of hyperbolic growth.  
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Hyperbolic growth is slow over a long time and fast over a short time but the 
slow and fast growth are the integral features of the same monotonically increasing 
distribution, which is easier to understand by using the reciprocal values of the 
growing entity (Nielsen, 2014).   In such displays, the illusion of distinctly different 
components disappears because hyperbolic growth is then represented by a 
decreasing straight line, which is easy to understand. It then becomes obvious that 
hyperbolic distribution cannot be divided into distinctly different sections governed 
by different mechanism because it makes no sense to divide a straight line into 
arbitrarily chosen sections and claim different mechanism for such arbitrarily-
selected section. It is then also clear that it is impossible to determine the transition 
from a slow to fast growth. Which point on a straight line should we select to 
identify such a transition? The transition does not happen at any specific time but 
gradually over the whole range of time.  
Our analysis shows that the Industrial Revolution had generally no impact on 
the growth of human population. The only boosting of growth, which coincided 
with the Industrial Revolution was in Africa but this boosting appears to have not 
been caused by the usually assumed beneficial effects of the Industrial Revolution 
but by the rapidly deteriorating living conditions associated with the colonisation 
of Africa. Our analysis also shows that the postulated takeoffs from stagnation to 
growth (Galor, 2005; 2008a; 2011; 2012a) never happened because there was no 
stagnation in the growth of population. We have shown earlier (Nielsen, 2016a) 
that there were no takeoffs in the growth of the GDP, global or regional. The 
demonstrated now absence of takeoffs in the growth of population shows that the 
claimed by Galor takeoffs in the income per capita (GDP/cap) did not exist.  
Galor describes the imaginary and non-existing features, which have nothing to 
do with the economic growth or with the growth of human population, features 
which were conjured from such habitually distorted displays as shown in Figure 1, 
interpretations based on impressions, which were never checked by the scientific 
analysis of data. They describe a world of fiction. All his explanations of the 
mechanism of economic growth based on these and other imaginary features are 
not only irrelevant but also misleading.  
Galor’s Unified Growth Theory is fundamentally incorrect and is repeatedly 
contradicted by data (Nielsen, 2014; 2015a; 2016a; 2016b; 2016d), ironically by 
the same data, which were used but never analysed during the formulation of this 
theory. The evidence contradicting the fundamental postulates of the Unfired 
Growth Theory is overwhelming and further evidence will be presented in 
forthcoming publications. This evidence questions not only the fundamental 
postulates of the Unified Growth Theory but also many similar postulates used 
traditionally in economic and demographic research, postulates which are based 
largely on impressions and conjectures but postulates, which are repeatedly 
contradicted by the analysis of Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001; 2010) as well as 
by other related research (Kapitza, 2006; Kremer, 1993; Podlazov, 2002; 
Shklovskii, 1962; 2002; von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960; von Hoerner, 1975; 
see also Nielsen, 2016c; 2016e and references therein). 
In science, just one contradicting evidence is sufficient to show that 
contradicted postulates need to be closely examined and revised. Unified Growth 
Theory is scientifically unacceptable and so are also many traditional 
interpretations of the historical economic growth and of the growth of human 
population.   
Data and their analysis suggest new lines of research. There is no need to waste 
time to discuss and explain the mechanism of stagnation and takeoffs from 
stagnation to growth because these features are contradicted by data. What needs to 
be explained is why the historical economic growth and the growth of human 
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population were hyperbolic and why relatively recently they were diverted to 
slower but still fast-increasing trajectories. There is also a need to find out how to 
control these fast-increasing trajectories. 
Unified Growth Theory is not only spurious but also dangerously misleading. It 
claims erroneously that after a long epoch of stagnation in the economic growth we 
have now entered a sustained-growth regime. This concept suggests a prosperous 
and secure future. However, mathematical analysis of data shows that the past 
economic growth was stable and sustainable but now it increases alarmingly fast 
(Nielsen, 2015b; 2016a). The false sense of security is replaced by the realisation 
of the urgent need to control and regulate economic growth and by the generally 
know need to control the growth of population. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of the ubiquitous, grossly-distorted and self-misleading diagrams used to create 
the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011). Madison’s data (Maddison, 2001) were used during 
the formulation of this theory but they were never analysed. Such state-of-the-art was used to 
construct a system of scientifically-unsupported concepts, interpretations and explanations. 
 
 
Figure 2. The same data (Maddison, 2001) as used in Figure 1 but now displayed accurately and 
analysed. They follow monotonically-increasing distributions, which cannot be divided into 
distinctively-different components (Nielsen, 2014, 2015a). 
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World Population 
 
Figure 3. Reciprocal values of the world population data (Maddison, 2010) identify uniquely 
hyperbolic distribution between AD 1000 and around 1950 because they follow a decreasing straight 
line. From around 1950, the growth of population started to be diverted to a new trajectory. Industrial 
Revolution had no impact on changing the growth trajectory. There were also no takeoffs from 
stagnation to growth around the postulated times for developed and less-developed regions (Galor, 
2008a, 2012a). This analysis and the absence of takeoffs in the corresponding GDP distribution 
(Nielsen, 2016a) show that there were no takeoffs in the income per capita (GDP/cap) distribution. 
Unified Growth Theory is contradicted yet again by the same data which were used but not analysed 
during the formulation of this theory. 
 
 
Figure 4. Growth of the world population. Data of Maddison (2010) are compared with hyperbolic 
distribution. The point at AD 1 is 75% higher than the fitted curve because there was a maximum in 
the growth of the world population around that time (Nielsen, 2016c).  Industrial Revolution had no 
impact on the growth of population. There were no takeoffs from stagnation to growth around the 
postulated time (Galor, 2008a, 2012a) for developed and less-developed regions. This analysis and 
the absence of takeoffs in the corresponding GDP distribution (Nielsen, 2016a) show that there were 
no takeoffs in the income per capita (GDP/cap) distribution. Unified Growth Theory is contradicted 
yet again by the same data which were used but not analysed during the formulation of this theory.  
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Western Europe 
 
 
Figure 5. Reciprocal values of population data for Western Europe (Maddison, 2010) identify 
uniquely hyperbolic distribution between AD 1000 and around 1915 because they follow a decreasing 
straight line. From around 1915, the growth of population started to be diverted to a slower 
trajectory. Industrial Revolution had no impact on changing the growth trajectory in the region where 
its influence should have been most pronounced. There was also no takeoff from stagnation to growth 
around the postulated time (Galor, 2008a, 2012a). This analysis and the absence of the takeoff in the 
corresponding GDP distribution (Nielsen, 2016a) show that there was no takeoff in the income per 
capita (GDP/cap) distribution. Unified Growth Theory is contradicted yet again by the same data 
which were used but not analysed during the formulation of this theory. 
 
 
Figure 6.Growth of human population in Western Europe. Data of Maddison (2010) are compared 
with hyperbolic distribution.  The point at AD 1 is 89% higher than the fitted curve. This discrepancy 
might be reflecting the maximum in the growth of the world population (Nielsen, 2016c). Industrial 
Revolution had no impact on the growth of population in Western Europe where the effects of this 
revolution should have been most prominent. There was no takeoff from stagnation to growth around 
the postulated time (Galor, 2008a, 2012a). This analysis and the absence of the takeoff in the 
corresponding GDP distribution (Nielsen, 2016a) show that there was no takeoff in the income per 
capita (GDP/cap) distribution. Unified Growth Theory is contradicted yet again by the same data 
which were used but not analysed during the formulation of this theory.  
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Eastern Europe 
 
Figure 7.Reciprocal values of population data for Eastern Europe (Maddison, 2010) identify 
uniquely hyperbolic distribution between AD 1000 and around 1935 because they follow a decreasing 
straight line. From around 1935, hyperbolic growth started to be diverted to a slower trajectory. 
Industrial Revolution had no impact on changing the growth trajectory in Eastern Europe. There was 
also no takeoff from stagnation to growth around the postulated time (Galor, 2008a, 2012a). This 
analysis and the absence of the takeoff in the corresponding GDP distribution (Nielsen, 2016a) show 
that there was no takeoff in the income per capita (GDP/cap) distribution. Unified Growth Theory is 
contradicted yet again by the same data which were used but not analysed during the formulation of 
this theory. 
 
 
Figure 8. Growth of human population in Eastern Europe. Data of Maddison (2010) are compared 
with hyperbolic distribution.  The point at AD 1 is 45% higher than the fitted curve. This discrepancy 
might be reflecting the maximum in the growth of the world population (Nielsen, 2016c) around that 
time. Industrial Revolution had no impact on the growth of population in Eastern Europe. There was 
no takeoff from stagnation to growth around the postulated time (Galor, 2008a; 2012a). This analysis 
and the absence of the takeoff in the corresponding GDP distribution (Nielsen, 2016a) show that 
there was no takeoff in the income per capita (GDP/cap) distribution. Unified Growth Theory is 
contradicted yet again by the same data which were used but not analysed during the formulation of 
this theory. 
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Former USSR  
 
Figure 9.Reciprocal values of population data for the former USSR (Maddison, 2010) identify 
uniquely hyperbolic distribution between AD 1 and 1920 because they follow closely the decreasing 
straight line. From around 1920 the growth started to be diverted to a slower trajectory. Industrial 
Revolution had no impact on changing the growth trajectory. There was also no takeoff from 
stagnation to growth around the postulated time (Galor, 2008a; 2012a) or around any other time 
because there was no stagnation. There was even no transition to a faster hyperbolic growth. This 
analysis and the absence of the takeoff in the corresponding GDP distribution (Nielsen, 2016a) show 
that there was no takeoff in the income per capita (GDP/cap) distribution. Unified Growth Theory is 
contradicted yet again by the same data which were used but not analysed during the formulation of 
this theory. 
 
 
Figure 10. Growth of human population in countries of the former USSR. Data of Maddison (2010) 
are compared with hyperbolic distribution.  Industrial Revolution had no impact on the growth of 
population. There was no takeoff from stagnation to growth around the postulated time (Galor, 
2008a; 2012a) or around any other time because there was no stagnation. This analysis and the 
absence of the takeoff in the corresponding GDP distribution (Nielsen, 2016a) show that there was no 
takeoff in the income per capita (GDP/cap) distribution. Unified Growth Theory is contradicted yet 
again by the same data which were used but not analysed during the formulation of this theory. 
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Asia (including Japan) 
 
Figure 11.Reciprocal values of population data for Asia (Maddison, 2010) identify uniquely 
hyperbolic distribution between AD 1 and 1920 because they follow closely the decreasing straight 
line. From around 1920, the growth started to be diverted to a temporary faster trajectory. There was 
no takeoff from stagnation to growth around the postulated time (Galor, 2008a; 2012a) because there 
was no stagnation. The temporary boosting around 1920 appears to be a part of the commonly 
observed transition from the historical hyperbolic growth to a slower trajectory. This analysis and the 
absence of the takeoff in the corresponding GDP distribution (Nielsen, 2016a) show that there was no 
takeoff in the income per capita (GDP/cap) distribution. Unified Growth Theory is contradicted yet 
again by the same data which were used but not analysed during the formulation of this theory. 
 
 
 
Figure 12.Growth of human population in Asia. Data of Maddison (2010) are compared with the 
hyperbolic distribution.  There was no stagnation but a hyperbolic growth between at least AD 1000 
and 1920. The size of the population at AD 1 is 80% higher than the fitted hyperbolic distribution, 
reflecting probably the maximum in the growth of the world population around that year (Nielsen, 
2016c).  There was no takeoff from stagnation to growth around the postulated time (Galor, 2008a; 
2012a) because there was no stagnation before the temporary boosting from around 1920. This 
analysis and the absence of the takeoff in the corresponding GDP distribution (Nielsen, 2016a) show 
that there was no takeoff in the income per capita (GDP/cap) distribution. Unified Growth Theory is 
contradicted yet again by the same data which were used but not analysed during the formulation of 
this theory. 
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Africa 
 
 
Figure 13. Reciprocal values of population data for Africa (Maddison, 2010) identify uniquely two 
hyperbolic distributions: AD 1-1840 and AD 1840-1980 because they follow closely the decreasing 
straight lines. From around 1980 the growth started to be diverted to a slower trajectory. There was 
no takeoff from stagnation to growth around the postulated time (Galor, 2008a; 2012a) because there 
was no stagnation. However, there was a transition around AD 1840 from a slow to a fast hyperbolic 
trajectory. This analysis and the absence of the takeoff in the corresponding GDP distribution 
(Nielsen, 2016a) show that there was no takeoff in the income per capita (GDP/cap) distribution. 
Unified Growth Theory is contradicted yet again by the same data which were used but not analysed 
during the formulation of this theory. 
 
 
Figure 14.Growth of human population in Africa. Data of Maddison (2010) are compared with two 
hyperbolic distributions, AD 1-1840 and AD 1840-1980.  There was no stagnation but a hyperbolic 
growth. There was no takeoff from stagnation to growth around the postulated time (Galor, 2008a; 
2012a) because there was no stagnation. The fast hyperbolic growth, continued undisturbed until 
1980 when it started to be diverted to a slower trajectory. Around 1840, there was a transition from a 
slow to a fast hyperbolic trajectory. This analysis and the absence of the takeoff in the corresponding 
GDP distribution (Nielsen, 2016a) show that there was no takeoff in the income per capita (GDP/cap) 
distribution. Unified Growth Theory is contradicted yet again by the same data which were used but 
not analysed during the formulation of this theory. 
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Latin America 
 
 
Figure 15. Reciprocal values of population data for Latin America (Maddison, 2010) identify two 
hyperbolic distributions: AD 1-1500 and AD 1600-1900 because they follow closely the decreasing 
straight lines. From around 1900 the growth started to be diverted to a slower trajectory. There was 
no takeoff from stagnation to growth around the postulated time (Galor, 2008a; 2012a) but there was 
a transition around the postulated takeoff to a slower trajectory. Data replace Galor’s takeoff by a 
transition to a slower trajectory. This analysis and the absence of the takeoff in the corresponding 
GDP distribution (Nielsen, 2016a) show that there was no takeoff in the income per capita (GDP/cap) 
distribution. Unified Growth Theory is contradicted yet again by the same data which were used but 
not analysed during the formulation of this theory. 
 
 
Figure 16. Growth of human population in Latin America. Data of Maddison (2010) are compared 
with two hyperbolic distributions, AD 1-1500 and AD 1600-1900.  There was no stagnation but a 
hyperbolic growth. There was no takeoff from stagnation to growth around the postulated time (Galor, 
2008a; 2012a) because there was no stagnation. The fast hyperbolic growth continued undisturbed 
until 1900 when it started to be diverted to a slower trajectory. Data replace Galor’s takeoff by a 
transition to a slower trajectory. This analysis and the absence of the takeoff in the corresponding 
GDP distribution (Nielsen, 2016a) show that there was no takeoff in the income per capita (GDP/cap) 
distribution. Unified Growth Theory is contradicted yet again by the same data which were used but 
not analysed during the formulation of this theory. 
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